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When Added Hurdles Cause Actual Prejudice: 
Exempting Knowing-Use-of-Perjured-Testimony 
Claims from Brecht Analysis on Collateral 
Review 
Melanie A. Johnson 
  INTRODUCTION   
Early one December morning in 1994, a gunman walked into 
a bar in Erie, Pennsylvania, and opened fire, killing one patron 
and injuring another before fleeing the scene.1 Three years later, 
with little evidence to go on, a man named Vance Haskell was 
formally charged as the shooter.2 The charge was based exclu-
sively on circumstantial evidence and eyewitness testimony.3 By 
the time his trial rolled around, only a single witness, Antoinette 
Blue, was able to consistently identify Haskell as the shooter.4 
Haskell was convicted of first-degree murder, with Blue’s 
testimony serving as the primary evidence against him.5 He was 
 
   J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 2010, 
University of Oregon. I would like to thank the staff and editors of Minnesota 
Law Review—particularly Torie Watkins, R. David Hahn, Jakob Brecheisen, 
Mel Pulles, and Ronald Waclawski—for their help in preparing this Note for 
publication. Thank you also to Erik, Lizzy, Mariah, and my beloved friends in 
Minnesota for inspiring me to be a better advocate, and to my family in Oregon 
for their love and support. Copyright © 2019 by Melanie A. Johnson. 
 1. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 141 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
 2. Id. at 141. 
 3. Id. at 140. 
 4. Forty witnesses were called to testify at Haskell’s trial. Of the four who 
ever claimed to be able to identify Haskell as the shooter, three were unable or 
unwilling to identify the shooter consistently. Id. The fourth, Antoinette Blue, 
provided a seemingly strong eyewitness identification, testifying that she had 
not only seen Haskell pull the trigger, she had met him in town several weeks 
before the shooting and smoked marijuana with him in the parking lot twenty 
minutes prior. Id. at 143. Blue came to police with this testimony three years 
after the shooting, after she had been picked up on two warrants and was await-
ing charges in Erie County Jail. Id. at 143. 
 5. See id. at 145. 
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sentenced to life in prison, with an additional fifteen to thirty 
months tacked on for other charges.6 More than twenty years 
later, Haskell challenged his conviction before the Third Cir-
cuit.7 He posed one key question: If an incarcerated person 
learns that the state knowingly presented false testimony in or-
der to secure a conviction against him, how likely does it have to 
be that knowledge of the truth could have affected the jury’s ver-
dict before a reviewing court will grant a new trial?8  
Prosecutors are barred from falsifying evidence by both 
strict professional ethical standards9 and more than eighty years 
of case law.10 If such misconduct is discovered immediately after 
trial, the impact of this discovery can be dramatic.11 On direct 
review, if the state is found to have suppressed evidence material 
 
 6. Haskell v. Folina, Civil Action No. 10-149 Erie, 2015 WL 5227855, at *8 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2015), rev’d sub nom. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 139. 
 7. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 145. 
 8. See id. Haskell argues, and the Third Circuit agrees, that he only needs 
to establish the existence of a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury. The State argues that such claims 
must meet the actual-prejudice standard, requiring Haskell to show that the 
“error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 
jury’s verdict.” Id. at 152. 
 9. See AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION §§ 3-1.4(b), 3-6.6(c), 3-6.8(a). Prosecutors may face punishment 
from their own bar for some types of misconduct, but the rules differ from state 
to state. In Minnesota, prosecutors are often only required to “make timely dis-
closure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.” MINN. R. 
PROF ’L CONDUCT 3.8(d). 
 10. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 103 n.2 (1935) (asserting 
that the presentation of false testimony or suppression of evidence favorable to 
the accused by a prosecutor violates Due Process). 
 11. If misconduct is discovered during the time period for direct appeal, 
convictions can be reversed, reversed and remanded for retrial, or, if the prose-
cutor takes an action that causes the defendant to move for mistrial and results 
in the trial court granting the motion, barred for retrial under the principles of 
double jeopardy. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 38 A.3d 828, 840 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2011) (finding that double jeopardy principles apply when a prosecutor acts 
intentionally to prejudice a defendant’s right to fair retrial by defying court in-
structions intended to prevent taint of the complaining witness); Peter J. Hen-
ning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
713, 815–16 (1999). 
Prosecutors themselves may face punishment for unethical conduct, includ-
ing possible criminal prosecution for intentional acts. However, it can be diffi-
cult to seek civil remedies against unethical prosecutors—the Supreme Court 
held that prosecutors are absolutely immune for any actions that were “inti-
mately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 815–
19 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). While this “absolute 
immunity” has been dialed back in recent years, Imbler reflects reviewing 
courts’ reluctance to cast judgment on the action of state prosecutors. Id. at 819. 
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to the defendant’s case, including by obscuring the truth about a 
testifying witness, the defendant’s conviction must be over-
turned.12 But once the defendant has exhausted his state appel-
late remedies, and the conviction becomes final, correcting pros-
ecutorial misconduct becomes more of a challenge.13 
Historically, on both direct and collateral review, when a de-
fendant claimed that the prosecutor in his case knowingly pre-
sented or failed to correct false testimony, his claims were ana-
lyzed under the materiality standard established by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs.14 This standard simply 
asked whether it was reasonably likely that the jury’s verdict 
could have been affected by knowledge of the truth.15 But in the 
mid-1990s, the Supreme Court began making substantial 
changes to habeas jurisprudence.16 Since then, many federal 
courts have argued that a second prong must be added to the 
materiality analysis of all constitutional trial errors raised on 
collateral review, including perjured-testimony claims.17 This 
prong, sometimes called the Brecht hurdle, requires the trial er-
ror, already material under the reasonable-likelihood standard, 
to have caused “actual prejudice”—that is, substantial harm—to 
the petitioner’s case.18 
For twelve years, only one U.S. court of appeals diverged 
from this approach.19 In 2005, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
existing materiality standard used on direct appeal was suffi-
cient for perjured-testimony claims raised on collateral review, 
justifying its decision on grounds that a conviction obtained 
 
 12. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). 
 13. Even defining “prosecutorial misconduct” under law can be a challenge. 
The Supreme Court has said that “the touchstone of due process analysis in 
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the cul-
pability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). 
 14. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. 
 15. This standard is called the “reasonable likelihood” standard. Agurs, 427 
U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 16. See generally A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New 
Rules” and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1 (2002) (explaining the changing landscape of habeas jurisprudence); 
Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open but the Door Is Locked: Habeas Corpus 
and Harmless Error, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 115, 124–28 (1994) (analyzing 
changes to habeas jurisprudence in the Rehnquist Court contemporaneously in 
1990s). 
 17. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). 
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through “perjurious or deceptive means” weakens “the entire 
foundation of our system of justice.”20 In August 2017, the Third 
Circuit joined this minority view.21 The Third Circuit found that 
knowledge of facts pertaining to a key witness’s credibility posed 
a “reasonable, and significant, likelihood of affecting the judg-
ment of the jury” and noted that even if the State had not solic-
ited the false evidence, it had permitted the testimony to go un-
corrected, therefore violating the defendant’s due process rights 
and requiring the conviction to be set aside.22 
This Note discusses a deepening circuit split over whether 
habeas petitioners, seeking freedom as a matter of constitutional 
right, must meet an added actual-prejudice hurdle when raising 
perjured-testimony claims on collateral review, or if the mere 
possibility that the suppressed truth could have affected the 
jury’s verdict renders the claim sufficient for the court to grant 
relief. 
Part I discusses the two standards currently used by federal 
courts to weigh the materiality of trial errors stemming from 
prosecutorial misconduct, analyzing the way these standards 
have changed over time, highlighting the classification of consti-
tutional errors as “trial” or “structural,” and detailing a funda-
mental shift in the way these errors were evaluated by appellate 
and post-conviction courts from 1963 to 1995.23 It also addresses 
the difference between collateral and direct review, in order to 
explain in Part II why the Circuits continue to disagree on 
whether these procedures should be treated differently. 
Part II discusses the circuit split, the courts’ varying ap-
proaches to materiality analysis, and the differing fact patterns 
in each case that led petitioners to raise these perjured-testi-
mony claims.24 
Part III analyzes why the Third Circuit was right to join the 
Ninth in maintaining the reasonable-likelihood standard for per-
jured-testimony claims raised on collateral review and why the 
other Circuits, including those still undecided, should create a 
bright-line rule by abandoning actual-prejudice analysis for all 
 
 20. Id. at 988. 
 21. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(describing the State’s failure to correct false testimony as a “corruption of the 
truth-seeking function of the trial process” (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 
(1976))). 
 22. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 146 . 
 23. Infra notes 25–87. 
 24. Infra notes 89–175. 
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Brady claims. It argues that knowing abuse of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, including the introduction of perjured or false testimony, 
should be a grave enough concern to justify retaining the more 
defendant-friendly standard on collateral review, or even reclas-
sifying such claims as structural errors subject to immediate re-
versal. 
I.  REVIEWING PERJURED TESTIMONY CLAIMS   
This Part provides some background on the two standards 
at play in the deepening circuit split over materiality standards. 
The reasonable-likelihood standard, widely used to determine 
materiality of knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims on di-
rect review, has been adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits 
for habeas petitions on collateral review.25 Meanwhile, the two-
prong actual-prejudice standard, based on the Brecht approach 
to constitutional trial error, has been adopted by the First, Sixth, 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits for all knowing-use-of-perjured-
testimony claims on final review.26 Section A delves into the writ 
of habeas corpus and how collateral review differs from direct 
review. Section B then addresses the type of judicial review af-
forded to various constitutional errors and how prosecutorial 
misconduct is generally characterized. Section C discusses the 
methods used by reviewing courts to determine the impact of 
such misconduct on the petitioner’s trial, while Section D exam-
ines the shifting jurisprudence around prosecutorial suppression 
claims when raised on collateral review. 
A. FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF MAY BE SOUGHT ON COLLATERAL 
REVIEW 
The writ of habeas corpus allows individuals to challenge 
the underlying legality of their incarceration by giving a court 
the ability to afford relief “to those grievously wronged.”27 Ha-
beas relief for petitioners in state custody may be pursued in 
 
 25. See, e.g., Haskell, 866 F.3d at 146; Hayes, 399 F.3d at 988. 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1231 (11th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2013); Rosencrantz v. Lafler 
568 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2009); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 
1995). 
 27. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 621 (1993). Habeas petitioners 
seek immediate release as a remedy for these wrongs. Robin A. Colombo, Brecht 
v. Abrahamson: Hard Justice for State Prisoners?, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1115 
n.120 (1994) (“[F]ederal courts have the power and duty to provide the remedy 
of release for those deprived of their freedom without due process.” (citing Fay 
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–27, 438 (1963))). “[T]he writ does not require a court 
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state court under local post-conviction statutes and in federal 
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.28 Review of these petitions (called 
“collateral review”) must be based on the factual record from 
state court, plus any newly discovered evidence “that could not 
have been previously discovered through the exercise of due dil-
igence.”29 
Federal collateral review generally follows any direct ap-
peals at the state level (“direct review”),30 as well as state collat-
eral review.31 Generally speaking, direct review “afford[s] de-
fendants the opportunity to challenge the merits of a judgment 
and allege errors of law or fact,” while collateral review “pro-
vide[s] an independent and civil inquiry into the validity of a 
conviction and sentence, and as such [is] generally limited to 
challenges to constitutional, jurisdictional, or other fundamental 
violations that occurred at trial.”32 The burden of proof also 
shifts between direct and collateral review from the prosecution 
to the convicted petitioner.33 This burden-shifting mechanism in-
 
to determine a prisoner’s innocence or guilt, but . . . guards against illegal im-
prisonment.” Mark R. Barr, The Not-So-Great Writ: An Analysis of Recent Tenth 
Circuit Decisions Reflecting the Current Difficult in Obtaining Habeas Corpus 
Relief for State Prisoners, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 407 (2003). 
 28. For state post-conviction relief, see, for example, MINN. STAT. § 589 
(2017). For federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
 29. § 2254(e)(2). 
 30. Direct review is considered the “principal way to challenge a convic-
tion.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 620. Defendants have an automatic right of appeal, 
subject to strict time limits. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) (requiring defendant to file no-
tice of appeal within fourteen days of entry of judgment or within fourteen days 
after filing of a timely appeal by the government). Although errors found after 
the timeline for appeal has passed may be corrected on collateral review, “[i]t is 
more appropriate, whenever possible, to correct errors reachable by appeal ra-
ther than remit the parties to a new collateral proceeding.” Bartone v. United 
States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963) (per curiam). 
 31. State post-conviction relief must be pursued first; a federal writ may 
only be granted if the applicant has “exhausted the remedies available” in state 
court or if the state lacks appropriate corrective processes. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(1). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
state inmates have one year from the date of conviction to petition for federal 
habeas relief. Id. § 2244(d); see also Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545 (2011). The timer 
on this statute of limitations is paused during pendency of any state post-con-
viction claim or motion. Id. at 549. 
 32. Graham v. Borgen, 483 F.3d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
 33. Before Brecht v. Abrahamson, the government bore the burden on col-
lateral review of showing that a constitutional error in a petitioner’s case was 
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” By requiring a showing of “actual preju-
dice” to the petitioner’s case before a state conviction may be overturned on the 
basis of constitutional error, the Brecht Court shifted the burden from the state 
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creases the degree of challenge faced by petitioners seeking ha-
beas relief.34 
The writ of habeas corpus, in short, acts as the judicial 
equivalent of a Hail Mary pass for incarcerated individuals. In 
the habeas cases discussed below, the petitioners raised under-
lying due process concerns as the constitutional grounds for col-
lateral review. 
B. DEFENDANTS HAVE A DUE PROCESS RIGHT AGAINST 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Criminal defendants are entitled to procedural due process 
in a court of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.35 
This constitutional right is violated when the government know-
ingly presents or fails to correct false testimony in a criminal 
proceeding.36 The state must disclose all material evidence rele-
vant to the case to defense counsel;37 failure to disclose such ev-
idence, whether by negligence or design, is a responsibility borne 
by the prosecutor.38 
When a defendant alleges that his constitutional rights have 
been violated, the violation is categorized either as a structural 
error or a trial error.39 Trial errors occur during the presentation 
 
to the prisoner. Linda Greenhouse, Overview of the Term: The Court’s Coun-
terrevolution Comes in Fits and Starts, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1993, at E4–E5; see 
also Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 34. See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vison of Habeas Corpus, 98 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (2010) (discussing petitioners’ difficulty in meeting the 
burden of proof on collateral review). 
 35. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Ma-
linski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To 
suppose that ‘due process of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and 
another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate rejection.”). 
 36. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); Hayes v. Brown, 
399 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Due process protects defendants against the 
knowing use of any false evidence by the State, whether it be by document, tes-
timony, or any other form of admissible evidence.” (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264, 269 (1959))); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 37. This standard was established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963). 
 38. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. 
 39. An error violating a defendant’s constitutional rights is considered a 
constitutional error. See Gavin R. Tisdale, A New Look at Constitutional Errors 
in a Criminal Trial, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1665, 1669–73 (2016). “To find struc-
tural error, a court must find that the error: (1) did not occur during the presen-
tation of the case to the jury, (2) cannot be quantitatively assessed on appeal, or 
(3) affects the framework in which the trial proceeds.” Id. at 1678 (examining 
the legal landscape after Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (explaining 
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of the case to the jury and are subject to harmless-error analy-
sis;40 these errors must be assessed in light of all evidence pre-
sented to the jury.41 The harmless-error analysis applied to trial 
errors “represents an accommodation between a criminal de-
fendant’s interest in receiving a remedy for the violation of a con-
stitutional right and the state’s interest in preserving convic-
tions where the error did not affect the outcome of the trial.”42 
Structural errors, on the other hand, affect the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, creating a fundamental defect 
in the courtroom environment so inherently unjust as to require 
immediate remedy.43 Common structural errors include judicial 
bias, exclusion of jurors on racial grounds, failure to recognize 
the right to counsel, and violation of the right to a public trial.44 
Prosecutorial misconduct was established as a form of con-
stitutional trial error by Brady v. Maryland, which marked a 
shift in the jurisprudence surrounding discovery and evidentiary 
withholding.45 The Supreme Court in Brady found that certain 
forms of evidentiary suppression46 by the prosecution, whether 
made in good faith or bad, brought the substantive fairness of 
trial into question and were therefore automatically material to 
the case.47 If an incident is material under Brady, it can never 
 
that the use of perjured testimony by the state has not been deemed to “affect[ ]  
the framework within which the trial proceeds”)).  
 40. Under harmless-error analysis, a new trial is required “only if the state 
can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
verdict.” Tisdale, supra note 39, at 1670. 
 41. See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Shih 
Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 42. John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Ha-
beas Corpus After Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 183 
(1993). 
 43. Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589 (citing Shih Wei Su, 335 F.3d at 126). 
 44. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997). 
 45. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963); see also Bennett L. Gersh-
man, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 708–09 (2006). 
 46. The Brady rule arguably applies in three cases: (1) the government’s 
failure to provide requested exculpatory evidence; (2) the government’s failure 
to volunteer exculpatory evidence; and (3) the government’s knowing presenta-
tion of or failure to correct false testimony. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 
97, 103–07 (1976). 
 47. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“We now hold that the suppression by the pros-
ecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
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be dismissed as harmless.48 This was a game-changing shift in 
jurisprudence for prosecutors.49 Under Brady, the State was re-
quired to share with defense counsel any exculpatory or im-
peaching evidence material to the guilt or innocence of a defend-
ant.50 Failing to correct testimony that the prosecutor knows at 
the time to be false, then, is a Brady violation.51 
In the years since Brady, the knowing use of perjured testi-
mony has continued to be treated as inherently more problem-
atic than other Brady violations.52 Courts describe such conduct 
as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion and trust, as well as a 
“corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.”53 
In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court found that “a con-
viction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fun-
damentally unfair” and should be set aside.54 Yet, despite creat-
ing such fundamental procedural inequity, prosecutorial 
 
 48. “A finding of materiality of the evidence is required under Brady. . . . A 
new trial is required if ‘the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likeli-
hood have affected the judgment of the jury . . . .’” Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (citations omitted); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Harm-
less-error analysis asks whether the constitutional error had “substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 
750, 776 (1946)). 
 49. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesman-
ship Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 
140 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (describing how the adversarial process encour-
ages prosecutors and defense attorneys to conceal evidence that the jury might 
find helpful in establishing the truth).  
 50. Brady, 373 U.S. at 90–91. 
 51. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155. It should be noted that most courts believe that 
the prosecution has no obligation to disclose exculpatory information acquired 
after the conviction. See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 
(2009) (“A criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the 
same liberty interests as a free man.”). This, however, could change if more ju-
risdictions adopt a recent amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, requiring the prosecutor to “promptly disclose” any “new, credible and ma-
terial evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did 
not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted.” MODEL RULES OF 
PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 52. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976); see, e.g., Browning 
v. Baker, 875 F.3d 444, 461–63 (9th Cir. 2017) (granting habeas relief on claim 
that prosecutors failed to correct witness’s false testimony on the status of his 
plea bargain with the State); United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 242–43 
(5th Cir. 1979) (granting habeas relief on claim that prosecutor failed to correct 
false testimony concerning promises of leniency made to state witnesses, despite 
defense counsel receiving a letter informing prosecutor of the promises). 
 53. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. 
 54. Id. at 103. “[T]he same result obtains when the State, although not so-
liciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Giglio, 405 
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misconduct in the form of willfully-presented perjured testimony 
is not generally considered a structural error because it occurs 
only during the progress of trial.55 It has been established that 
such misconduct can become structurally problematic if an inci-
dent is particularly egregious or can be identified as part of a 
larger pattern of misconduct.56 However, while the argument 
could be made that prosecutorial dishonesty inherently “[in-
fect[s] the integrity of the proceeding,”57 this approach has not 
been widely adopted by courts addressing perjured-testimony 
claims on collateral review. 
C. DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
ON PETITIONER’S CASE 
A decade after Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court split 
potential Brady withholding violations into three categories: 
failing to disclose evidence, failing to disclose evidence after a 
defense request, and knowingly using false testimony.58 These 
three categories were initially assigned the same materiality 
standard for determining their effect on the outcome of the trial: 
reasonable likelihood. In order to establish a due process claim 
under this materiality standard, a petitioner must show that 
there exists a reasonable likelihood that an instance of eviden-
tiary withholding could have affected the judgment of the jury.59 
 
U.S. at 153 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). This remains 
in line with the Brady rule that any violations found material could not be dis-
missed as harmless error. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 55. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005); Shih Wei Su v. Fil-
ion, 335 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 56. The Court in Brecht reserved “the possibility that in an unusual case, a 
deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type . . . might so infect the 
integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even if it did 
not substantially influence the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 638 n.9 (1993); see, e.g., Watts v. Mahally, 247 F. Supp. 3d 605, 607, 614 
n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (finding per se reversible error in the trial judge’s “decision 
to instruct the jury with an obviously irrelevant, inadmissible and highly prej-
udicial fact dehors the record, over defense counsel’s objection”); see also infra 
note 79 and accompanying text. 
The Sixth Circuit has also noted that perjured-testimony claims could be 
considered structural error, free from harmless-error analysis, if the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled that they were. See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589 
(6th Cir. 2009); infra Part III.C. 
 57. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9. 
 58. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103–07 (finding that the rule in Brady applies in 
three “quite different” situations that might arise at trial). 
 59. A petitioner seeking to establish a due process claim under the Agurs 
standard must show that (1) a government witness committed perjury; (2) the 
prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was false; (3) the 
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The reasonable-likelihood standard, sometimes called the Agurs 
standard, sets a strict course for prosecutors, recognizing the 
state’s obligation not to deceive,60 as well as its obligation to cor-
rect.61 
Yet, despite assigning all three categories the same materi-
ality standard, the Agurs Court was particularly troubled by per-
jured-testimony claims, which the Court felt lacked the potential 
innocence of intent inherent in the two evidentiary-withholding 
categories.62 
Brady jurisprudence continued to evolve, and, nine years 
later, the Supreme Court created a new standard for any Brady 
claims alleging evidentiary withholding: “reasonable probabil-
ity.”63 To determine whether a material error had occurred, this 
new standard required reviewing courts to find a reasonable 
probability that the suppressed evidence would have affected the 
jury’s verdict.64 Yet, the Court apparently had the same concerns 
in mind during Bagley as it did during Agurs, because perjured-
testimony claims were expressly left under the reasonable-like-
lihood standard.65 
While both materiality standards leave room for an alleged 
instance of prosecutorial misconduct to be overlooked as harm-
less error if it fails to meet the impact requirement of the stand-
ard,66 the reasonable-likelihood standard is less discerning than 
 
false testimony was not corrected; and (4) there is a reasonable possibility that 
the perjured testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Lambert 
v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 60. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972). 
 61. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108. By combining these standards, Agurs created 
an obligation to set aside convictions obtained following the state’s failure to 
correct knowing or reckless deception by its prosecutors. 
 62. Id. at 109–12 (noting a prosecutor’s duty and obligations to the overrid-
ing concepts and interests of justice). 
 63. This failure to disclose must have occurred after general or specific re-
quests for information by defense counsel. For instance, defendants are permit-
ted to ask prosecutors to provide information about any inducements offered to 
testifying government witnesses and, under Brady and Bagley, prosecutors 
must share this information or risk having the requested witnesses’ testimony 
suppressed. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (discussing 
the impairment of the adversarial process if prosecutor fails to respond to Brady 
request). 
 64. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
 65. Id. at 713 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 66. Both standards also address the same threshold question: Has a consti-
tutional error occurred? See Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1995). 
Again, according to Giglio, if an incident is found material under Brady, a con-
stitutional error has occurred that can never be dismissed as harmless. Giglio 
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (requiring a new trial if the false 
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the reasonable-probability standard, opting for a mere possibil-
ity of jury impact over a probability.67 This difference means that 
the petitioner in a perjured-testimony case faces a lower materi-
ality burden based on the nature of the claim. Yet no matter 
which materiality standard is used, once the requirements of ei-
ther standard are met, the Brady rule remains: If a Brady viola-
tion is found material, it may never be dismissed as harmless.68 
D. SHIFTING JURISPRUDENCE AROUND BRADY CLAIMS RAISED 
BY HABEAS PETITIONERS ON COLLATERAL REVIEW 
On appeal, once a Brady violation meets its assigned mate-
riality standard, Agurs states that the conviction in question 
“must be set aside” and a new trial ordered.69 However, since 
1993, constitutional trial errors asserted in a federal habeas pe-
tition, unlike those on direct review, must meet an added actual-
prejudice hurdle.70 This Section will discuss this actual-preju-
dice analysis and the rationale behind it, as well as address the 
controversy involved in applying the standard to Brady viola-
tions. 
1. Adding an Actual-Prejudice Hurdle for Perjured-Testimony 
Claims on Collateral Review 
The Agurs reasonable-likelihood standard initially applied 
to claims raised on both direct and collateral review. Then in 
1993, a new line of jurisprudence came crashing in against 
Agurs. After years of decisions strongly limiting habeas relief,71 
 
testimony could, with any reasonable likelihood, affect the judgment of the 
jury). 
 67. Compare Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683–84 (finding a reasonable likelihood 
that jury’s verdict could have been different had the prosecutor not misleadingly 
induced defense counsel into believing that key government witnesses could not 
be impeached with inducements received from the State), with United States v. 
Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 127–28 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that the government’s 
presentation of false testimony was not reasonably likely to have affected the 
jury’s verdict where jurors found the defendant not guilty on the counts related 
to the testimony in question). 
 68. See supra note 48. 
 69. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. 
at 154). 
 70. Cases on direct review at the state level may use the local standard, 
often the more defendant-friendly “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” stand-
ard. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that before a 
federal constitutional error can be harmless, a court must declare the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 71. During this time, criminal convictions jumped, an increase credited to 
an expanding criminal code. See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of 
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the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson determined that 
due process violations raised on collateral review must pass one 
last obstacle: actual prejudice.72 Actual prejudice, sometimes 
called the Brecht hurdle, added a second layer of harmless-error 
analysis to existing materiality standards, inquiring whether 
the material due process violation also had a “substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”73 
This secondary hurdle created a distinct possibility that a con-
stitutional error previously found material to the defendant’s 
case might ultimately be found “harmless” under Brecht. 
The Court offered several reasons why existing materiality 
standards for constitutional trial errors should be elevated by 
this new prong of analysis on collateral review. First, courts pos-
sess a longstanding interest in maintaining the finality of con-
victions that survived direct review within the state court sys-
tem.74 The Court believed that assigning the government a less 
stringent materiality burden after direct review would help 
maintain that finality.75 Furthermore, comity and a respect for 
federalism discourage federal courts from doing anything that 
might impede on a state’s “sovereign power to punish offenders” 
and its “good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.”76 
The Court also noted a desire to avoid “encourag[ing] habeas 
petitioners to relitigate their claims.”77 This motivation high-
lights the final rationale: the fear that “liberal allowance” of the 
habeas writ will “degrade[]  the prominence of the trial itself”—
i.e., that trials will cease to be treated with respect if habeas re-
lief is too easily granted.78 
 
Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2010) (detailing the history of the 
“Great Writ” from the Warren Court era to the passage of the Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996). Meanwhile, federal habeas filings 
were limited in a number of ways, including eliminating most Fourth Amend-
ment claims from habeas review and removing the right to counsel for habeas 
petitioners. Id. The Supreme Court also imposed the exhaustion and procedural 
default requirements and applied res judicata to create a one-shot rule for fed-
eral habeas claims. Id. 
 72. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (denying habeas claim 
raised by petitioner). 
 73. In other words, Brecht asks if a material rights violation caused any 
actual prejudice to the defendant’s case at trial. Id. at 619. 
 74. Id. at 635. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 635 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982)). 
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However, even when the two-prong approach is applied to 
constitutional errors on collateral review, the possibility remains 
that a claim failing to reach the actual-prejudice threshold may 
still result in an overturned conviction. The Supreme Court has 
noted that a “deliberate and especially egregious” trial error 
could “combine[]  with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct 
[and] so infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the 
grant of habeas relief, even it did not substantially influence the 
jury’s verdict.”79 The First Circuit later explained this as the Su-
preme Court stressing “the importance of considering the cumu-
lative effect of all suppressed evidence in determining whether a 
Brady violation occurred.”80 In other words, the supposed “harm-
lessness” of certain individual due process violations may not ne-
gate the overall impact at trial that a pattern of such misconduct 
and violations may have. 
2. When Perjured Testimony Gets Left Behind: Dialing Back 
the Effect of Brecht on Brady Claims in Kyles v. Whitley 
Almost immediately, Brecht received backlash as courts 
struggled to apply the actual-prejudice hurdle to Brady claims 
on collateral review.81 Appellants argued that the hurdle was re-
dundant, noting that material Brady claims, as a rule, could not 
be dismissed as harmless.82 In 1995, the Court addressed the is-
sue in Kyles v. Whitley,83 creating an exemption from actual-prej-
udice analysis for Brady withholding claims analyzed under the 
existing reasonable-probability standard.  
The Court reasoned that any claim meeting the reasonable-
probability standard was automatically material and could not 
be dismissed as harmless error, even under Brecht.84 The Kyles 
 
 79. Id. at 654 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 18 (1967) (holding that the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that repetitive comments and instructions to the jury focusing on the de-
fendant’s failure to testify did not contribute to the petitioner’s conviction). 
 80. Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 272 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995)). 
 81. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open but the Door Is 
Locked: Habeas Corpus and Harmless Error, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 115, 124–
28 (1994) (describing various analytical and doctrinal critiques of the Court’s 
analysis in Brecht). 
 82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 83. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 84. In other words, a constitutional violation meeting the reasonable-prob-
ability standard requires automatic reversal. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435; see also 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (“A ‘reasonable probability’ is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 
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Court based its rationale on the history of the standard, explain-
ing that while it had once adopted the “substantial and injurious 
effect or influence” standard for constitutional errors on collat-
eral review, it later rejected that standard as not placing a high 
enough burden on the defendant.85 The Court reasoned 
that, since the existing materiality standard for evidentiary-
withholding claims already required “a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different,”86 such a claim 
would automatically meet Brecht’s requirement that suppres-
sion must have had a “substantial and injurious effect or influ-
ence” on the jury’s verdict.87 Therefore, the Court reasoned, any 
claim meeting the reasonable-probability standard automati-
cally surpassed the standard for materiality established by 
Brecht and could not be dismissed as harmless error.  
However, the Court, perhaps sensing a rhetorical stalemate 
over the weight of “likelihood” versus “probability,” declined to 
extend this reasoning to the knowing use of perjured testimony, 
explaining that the issue was not currently before them to de-
cide.88 The Kyles Court’s reluctance to explicitly address the ap-
plication of the Brecht hurdle to perjured-testimony claims 
raised by habeas petitioners on collateral review soon led to the 
Circuit split discussed in this Note. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT   
Following Agurs, federal courts initially agreed on the use 
of the reasonable-likelihood standard for federal and state per-
jured-testimony claims raised at all stages of the appeals and 
post-conviction process. However, a push for less permissive ha-
beas guidelines rumbled beneath the surface. Many viewed the 
reasonable-likelihood standard as overly defendant-friendly, 
particularly for cases on collateral review that had survived a 
series of direct appeals and habeas petitions at the state level. 
Federal courts sought to avoid upsetting the balance of state and 
federal power. 
 
 85. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435–36 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 
750, 776 (1946)). See generally Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622–23 
(1993) (re-assessing the “substantial and injurious effect” standard); United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (placing a higher burden on the defend-
ant). 
 86. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685 (White, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 87. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 
 88. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 n.7. 
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This Part will detail the progression of the Circuit split—
how the Circuits, in a post-Kyles world, initially handled the is-
sue of knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims on collateral 
review and why some courts chose to adopt a more challenging 
standard than the one faced on direct review. Section A explains 
how the circuit split over the added-prejudice hurdle initially be-
gan, and Section B explores how the split progressed, addressing 
the various defenses raised by each Circuit in dealing with facts 
before them. Finally, Section C delves into the most recent cir-
cuit case to take a side in the split, Haskell v. Superintendent 
Greene SCI,89 and explores why the Third Circuit chose to side 
with the minority of courts on the issue of actual prejudice. 
A. ESTABLISHING THE SPLIT: DETERMINING MATERIALITY OF 
PERJURED-TESTIMONY CLAIMS AFTER KYLES V. WHITLEY 
Until Brecht, “reasonable likelihood” was commonly ac-
cepted as the standard for knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony 
claims at all points of litigation. But after Brecht, and then Kyles, 
courts began to question the continued applicability of the un-
modified Agurs standard on collateral review. 
1. The First Circuit: Challenging the Reasonable-Likelihood 
Standard 
The First Circuit was the first to suggest that the Supreme 
Court had intended to make a change to the reasonable-likeli-
hood standard for perjured-testimony claims raised by habeas 
petitioners. Gilday v. Callahan90 built its argument based on the 
Supreme Court’s findings in Kyles v. Whitley earlier that year.91 
The First Circuit interpreted Brecht’s newly-minted actual-prej-
udice hurdle as applying to all constitutional trial errors on col-
lateral review, while accepting that Kyles removed the added 
hurdle from Brady withholding claims.92 However, because 
Kyles declined to decide whether this exemption applied to the 
government’s knowing use of perjured testimony, the First Cir-
cuit reasoned that the Brecht hurdle must still be applied in this 
particular category of Brady claims.93 Under this logic, Gilday 
 
 89. 866 F.3d 139, 139 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 90. 59 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 91. Id. at 267–68 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436). 
 92. In Kyles, the Court had found that harmless-error analysis could not be 
applied to Brady claims “arising in a habeas case outside the perjury-related 
context.” Gilday, 59 F.3d at 267 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 n.7). 
 93. Id. 
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proposed that perjured-testimony claims on collateral review 
face a two-pronged inquiry: “[W]as there a failure to disclose ma-
terial exculpatory evidence, and, if yes, was such failure harm-
less?”94 
The criminal offense at the heart of the Gilday casean 
armed bank robbery (intended to “raise funds in support of rad-
ical political activities”) and the murder of a responding police 
officerwas complex and politically sensitive.95 The First Cir-
cuit, seeming uncomfortable with the notion that applying a 
more defendant-friendly standard might increase the likelihood 
of finding reversible error in this case, spotted a solution in the 
precedent set by Brecht.96 Despite the prosecutor’s “deliberate 
strategy to misrepresent [witness] credibility and the knowing 
acquiescence of []  false testimony,” and despite the court’s ap-
parent contempt for these actions,97 the First Circuit in Gilday 
held that it was prevented from overturning the conviction by 
the actual-prejudice analysis in Brecht.98 
On direct review, the state court had determined that the 
prosecutors in Gilday had “improperly failed to disclose a deal 
made with the attorney” of Michael Fleischer, a key witness.99 
The Circuit, reviewing the issue de novo and applying the rea-
sonable-likelihood standard, agreed that “the information with-
held by the prosecutor would have provided the basis for power-
ful impeachment of Fleischer’s testimony;”100 however, upon 
reaching the actual-prejudice hurdle, the Circuit court found 
 
 94. Id. at 268. Despite the fact that Kyles only explicitly refers to the know-
ing use of perjured testimony, the First Circuit extends its interpretation to 
“equivalent” circumstances as noted in Bagley. Id. at 267. Rather than perjured 
testimony, Gilday involves a situation in which the prosecutor withheld evi-
dence about a key eyewitness that might have cast his identification of the de-
fendant into doubt. Id. at 267 n.10. 
 95. Id. at 260. 
 96. Id. at 268. 
 97. Id. at 269–70 (noting that the State, by taking steps to actively suppress 
information about the deal struck up with the testifying accomplice witnesses, 
appears to agree with the conclusion that disclosure could have affected the ju-
rors’ judgment). 
 98. Prosecutors are not relieved of disclosure duties by lack of a formal 
agreement or by the witness’s lack of specific knowledge of the agreement. See, 
e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683–84 (1985) (finding prosecutors’ 
failure to disclose key information in witness affidavits to be misleading and 
remanding the case to lower court to determine whether there existed a “rea-
sonable probability” that the result of petitioner’s trial would have been differ-
ent with proper disclosure). 
 99. Gilday, 59 F.3d at 268. 
 100. Id. at 269. 
  
1584 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1567 
 
that even if the jury had assigned no weight to Fleischer’s testi-
mony based on the suppressed impeachment evidence, “the sub-
stance of the case against Gilday would have remained the 
same.”101 Gilday faced a case built on considerable evidence, and 
Fleischer was a rebuttal witness tasked with “simply [restating] 
the earlier testimony of another witness.”102 Of the three essen-
tial Brady claims presented by the petitioner in Gilday,103 the 
First Circuit found that “none of the asserted nondisclosures, nor 
all of them cumulatively constitute reversible error” under the 
new standard.104 
2. The Ninth Circuit: Rejecting Brecht’s Application to 
Perjured-Testimony Claims on Collateral Review 
The issue of Brecht as it applied to knowing-use-of-perjured-
testimony claims remained relatively unchallenged for the next 
decade, until the Ninth Circuit broke from the First Circuit’s 
lead and concluded that when the applicable test for a constitu-
tional violation is derived from the materiality standard set by 
Agurs in 1976, Brecht need not apply.105 
Hayes v. Brown involved the prosecution of Blufford Hayes 
for the 1980 murder of a motel manager and burglary of the mo-
tel office.106 An alleged accomplice to the crime, A.J. James, was 
flown in for the trial, with prosecutors promising James that he 
could return home after testifying.107 However, without James’s 
knowledge, the prosecutor in Hayes’s case went further, promis-
ing James’s attorney that the witness would receive transac-
 
 101. Id. at 269–70. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Gilday claimed error in (1) the government’s failure to disclose exculpa-
tory statements from a non-testifying eyewitness; (2) the government’s failure 
to disclose exculpatory statements by two trial witnesses; and (3) the govern-
ment’s failure to correct false testimony presented by two accomplice-witnesses 
who testified that no deals had been reached for their cooperation in trial. Id. at 
271. 
 104. Id. at 267. Note that the First Circuit rejects these claims both under 
the Brecht actual-prejudice hurdle and Brecht’s exception for cumulatively egre-
gious conduct. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993). 
 105. Violations requiring the Agurs standard under law include claims in-
volving suppression, ineffective assistance of counsel, and perjured testimony. 
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing when Brecht’s 
analysis does not apply). 
 106. For more information on the factual basis of Hayes v. Brown, see id. at 
974–78. 
 107. Id. at 976–77. 
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tional immunity for the manager’s murder and dismissal of un-
related felony charges in exchange for testifying.108 The prosecu-
tor hoped to circumvent any questions that might reveal that 
James had been offered a deal to testify, and so, to prevent this 
information from reaching the trial judge and jury, James’s at-
torney agreed to keep the specifics of the deal from his client.109 
After the trial, the witness, unaware of the deal on his behalf, 
was returned to Florida on the prosecution’s dime, despite be-
lieving that he still faced pending charges in California.110 These 
charges were later dismissed.111 
The Ninth Circuit, upon reviewing the facts of the case, 
found that it clearly showed that “the State knowingly presented 
false evidence to the jury and made false representations to the 
trial judge as to whether the State had agreed not to prosecute 
James on his pending felony charges.”112 
Much like the First Circuit in Gilday, the Ninth Circuit ob-
jected to the prosecutor’s attempt to make a covert deal with a 
witness’s attorney that was not disclosed to the witness or the 
court.113 Both Circuits agreed that such a violation likely met the 
reasonable-likelihood standard, as disclosure of such a deal 
would have “reduced substantially, or even destroyed” the testi-
fying witness’s credibility on the stand.114 But while Gilday in-
terpreted the recent cases of Brecht and Kyles as combining to 
create a secondary hurdle for perjured-testimony claims,115 the 
Ninth Circuit, reviewing such a claim for the first time under 
this particular jurisprudence, took a different approach.116 The 
court found that “[a]pplication of the Agurs ‘any reasonable like-
lihood’ standard necessarily foreclose[d] a Brecht harmless error 
 
 108. Id. at 977. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 978. 
 113. Id. at 987–88 (finding that the State’s failure to disclose information 
about “powerful incentive[s]” offered to testifying witnesses threatens the integ-
rity of the criminal justice system). 
 114. Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 269 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 115. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 116. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court has declared a ma-
teriality standard, as it has for this type of constitutional error, there is no need 
to conduct a separate harmless error analysis. As the Supreme Court explained 
in Kyles, when considering a similar question about applying the Bagley disclo-
sure requirements, the required finding of materiality necessarily compels the 
conclusion that the error was not harmless.”). 
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analysis” and concluded that Kyles’s refusal to decide on per-
jured-testimony claims was mere dicta.117 “When the Supreme 
Court has declared a materiality standard, as it has for this type 
of constitutional error,” the Ninth Circuit explained, “there is no 
need to conduct a separate harmless error analysis.”118 
At the heart of the Ninth Circuit’s decision seemed to be its 
clear offense at the blatant deception engaged in by the prosecu-
tion team in Hayes.119 Prosecutors are barred from presenting 
false evidence, including false testimony,120 and the court sternly 
noted that tricking a witness into lying on the stand “does 
not . . . insulate the State from conforming its conduct to the re-
quirements of due process.”121 The court called the State’s behav-
ior “reprehensible,” noting that a witness’s lack of apparent com-
plicity in the falsehood “is what gives the false testimony the ring 
of truth, and makes it all the more likely to affect the judgment 
of the jury.”122 The Ninth Circuit explained that the use of false 
evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that “[o]ne 
of the bedrock principles of our democracy . . . is that the State 
may not use false evidence to obtain a criminal conviction.”123 
B. THE DEEPENING SPLIT: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR THE ADDED-
PREJUDICE HURDLE 
Despite the bold stance taken by the Ninth Circuit in Hayes, 
twelve years passed and the remaining Circuits, despite some-
times vocalizing serious reservations about excusing such poor 
prosecutorial behavior, fell in line behind the First Circuit and 
the Brecht hurdle. 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 979–80 (noting that the prosecutor specifically represented to the 
trial judge that no deal had been made for James’s testimony, eliciting sworn 
testimony from James on that issue both on direct and re-direct examination, 
and failing to correct the record at trial after doubling down on the witnesses’ 
credibility in closing argument). The Haskell court, in joining the Ninth Circuit 
in this split, will be similarly irate about the prosecution’s reliance at trial on 
testimony it knows to be false. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 
139, 150 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 120. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
 121. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 981 (“Few things are more repugnant to the consti-
tutional expectations of our criminal system than covert perjury[.]” (quoting N. 
Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001))). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 978 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269). 
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Their reasons varied. In 2009, the Sixth Circuit in Rosen-
crantz v. Lafler124 became the first to join Gilday in applying the 
actual-prejudice hurdle to perjured-testimony claims on collat-
eral review.125 Although the court called the decision a “close 
call” case, it ultimately concluded that Brecht’s policy concerns 
weighed heavier than the Ninth Circuit’s concerns about prose-
cutorial culpability.126 
1. The Sixth Circuit in Rosencrantz v. Lafler 
The knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony issue in Rosen-
crantz v. Lafler, a case involving sexual assault by a stranger, 
involved falsehoods told by the victim witness about pretrial 
communications she had had with the prosecutor in the case.127 
While the Sixth Circuit objected to the prosecutor’s conduct in 
failing to correct testimony from the victim that it knew was 
false,128 the court noted that defense counsel had managed, de-
spite this misconduct, to successfully impeach the victim’s testi-
mony at several turns during cross-examination.129 
Emphasizing that “most constitutional errors can be harm-
less,”130 the Sixth Circuit drew a line in the sand on the topic of 
collateral review. The court asserted that Brecht’s actual-preju-
dice analysis must be applied to all constitutional trial errors 
raised by habeas petitioners, with the exception of those explic-
itly exempted by Kyles, and that the Supreme Court had not 
deemed knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims “to be ‘struc-
tural’ in the sense that they ‘affect[]  the framework within which 
 
 124. 568 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 125. Id. at 587–90 (finding the State’s failure to disclose victim’s false testi-
mony material but ultimately harmless to the outcome of trial). 
 126. Id. at 589–90 (emphasizing the importance of pursuing “the prompt ad-
ministration of justice” and limiting habeas relief to those “grievously wronged”) 
(citation omitted). 
 127. Id. at 591–92. 
 128. Id. at 589 (“Certainly, the prosecutor’s behavior in this case constitutes 
misconduct that we condemn.”). 
 129. Despite the witness and prosecution’s silence on the matter of prior con-
versations with the State, the defense elicited admissions from the witness vic-
tim on her history of criminal fraud, prior lies made under oath about the case, 
and variations and inconsistencies in her testimony. Id. at 581. The Sixth Cir-
cuit in Rosencrantz found that after the defense had focused the jury on the 
inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, “it was up to the jury—not a federal 
court conducting collateral review. . .—to sort [it] out.” Id. at 585–86 (citing 
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 992 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Tallman, J., dis-
senting)). 
 130. Id. at 589 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)). 
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the trial proceeds.’”131 The Sixth Circuit explained that this in-
terpretation of knowing use of perjured testimony as a trial error 
could explain Brecht’s creation of an “unusual case” exception for 
patterns of prosecutorial misconduct that “so infect the integrity 
of the proceeding.”132 The Sixth Circuit seemed to find that the 
Ninth Circuit’s main error was the application of strict materi-
ality to a perjured-testimony claim that it acknowledged was not 
structural.133  
2. The Eleventh Circuit in Trepal v. Secretary, Florida 
Department of Corrections 
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit in Trepal v. Secretary, Florida 
Department of Corrections134 followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead, 
reasoning that the “more lenient . . . materiality standard leaves 
room for the possibility that perjured testimony may be material 
under [the reasonable-likelihood standard] but still be harmless 
under Brecht.”135 
Trepal involved a complicated poisoning murder and, unlike 
the other perjured-testimony cases in this split, the false testi-
mony in question came from an expert witness who overextended 
his identification of the chemical evidence.136 This perjury claim 
came to light about six years after the trial, when the Office of 
the Inspector General issued a report criticizing the expert’s 
work.137 Following the release of the report, the lower court in 
an evidentiary hearing found that there was no reasonable like-
lihood that the result of the petitioner’s trial would have been 
different had the false testimony been corrected—in other words, 
the court found that no constitutional error had occurred at 
all.138 
 
 131. Id. (quoting Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (al-
teration in original)). 
 132. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993)). 
 133. The Sixth Circuit acknowledges that Giglio could be read as saying that 
such error implicates structural concerns, but the Sixth Circuit seems to be 
awaiting direction from above, noting that “the Supreme Court has yet to ex-
plicitly hold [knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony] errors as structural.” Id. at 
589. The court explains that the Ninth Circuit in Hayes “erred in failing to dis-
tinguish false-testimony claims from Brady withholding claims.” Id. at 589–90 
(citing Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984). 
 134. Trepal v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 135. Id. at 1113. 
 136. Id. at 1100 (citing the OIG Report as criticizing the expert in presenting 
testimony that was “stronger than his analytical results would support”). 
 137. Id. at 1091. 
 138. Id. at 1119–20. This appears to be a case of the lower court mixing its 
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and 
pointed to Chapman v. California, upon which the Agurs reason-
able-likelihood standard was predicated.139 Chapman “rejected 
the argument that the Constitution requires a blanket rule of 
automatic reversal in the case of constitutional error,” conclud-
ing that some constitutional errors may be “so unimportant and 
insignificant” in the grand scheme of their case as to be deemed 
constitutionally harmless.140 The court reasoned that this poten-
tial insignificance is exactly the reason why constitutional errors 
were later subdivided into “‘structural defects,’ which require au-
tomatic reversal,” and “‘trial errors,’ which are subject to harm-
less[-]error analysis.”141 
The Eleventh Circuit’s application of the Brecht hurdle to 
perjured-testimony claims raised on federal collateral review put 
the onus on state courts to identify alleged constitutional errors 
and evaluate their prejudicial effects early in the review pro-
cess.142 The court’s greatest concern seemed not to be whether 
this use of a heightened standard was fair to defendants, but 
whether it was fair to the state courts that had previously 
ruled.143 The Eleventh Circuit found that, after Brecht, the 
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard previously used 
by Chapman could not be applied to cases on collateral review.144 
Because habeas relief is supposed to be a last resort, the court 
 
standards; the use of “would have” indicates a standard close to Bagley’s rea-
sonable-probability standard for Brady withholding claims rather than the rea-
sonable-likelihood “could have” standard used for the knowing use of perjured 
testimony. The Eleventh Circuit, however, shrugs off the difference: “As a mat-
ter of logic, when answering the question posed by the [Agurs] standard, saying 
that there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different 
is the same as saying that there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict 
could have been different.” Id. at 1120. 
 139. Id. at 1110–14. 
 140. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993) (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)). 
 141. Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1110–11. 
 142. What this ignores is that state courts may have failed in this duty for 
any number of reasons: political pressure, tunnel vision, etc. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s view of Brecht fails to acknowledge that the issue may not have had the 
opportunity to have been raised below under the lower standard. 
 143. Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1111 (“[S]tate courts are fully qualified to identify 
constitutional error and evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial pro-
cess . . . and [they] often occupy a superior vantage point from which to evaluate 
the effect of trial error . . . .”). 
 144. Id. (“Chapman was a direct-appeal case, and until Brecht, the Supreme 
Court had not had occasion to squarely address whether the Chapman ‘harm-
less[-]beyond[-]a[-]reasonable[-]doubt standard’ applied to cases on collateral 
review.” (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 630–38))). 
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reasoned that it would be impractical for such a powerful remedy 
to be granted on a mere “likelihood” that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial.145 
3. The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Clay 
The next year, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Clay146 
joined the split, agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that the use of 
false testimony qualifies as a trial error and is therefore amena-
ble to actual-prejudice analysis under Brecht.147 However, alt-
hough it was quick to reach a decision on the materiality issue, 
the court was also quick to note, as in Rosencrantz, that the Su-
preme Court could easily change this calculus by deeming such 
errors structural due to “the fundamental nature of the injury to 
the justice system caused by the knowing use of perjured testi-
mony by the state. . . .”148 
The habeas petition in Clay, which centered on a money 
laundering and wire fraud scheme, claimed that the government 
had knowingly permitted a coconspirator witness to falsely tes-
tify about his professional background in contracting and real 
estate.149 In applying the Brecht hurdle, the Eighth Circuit ex-
plained that any suppressed evidence under this standard must 
be analyzed cumulatively and found that, as one of forty wit-
nesses during a weeklong trial, the perjuring witness was not 
significant enough to the prosecution to have a “substantial and 
injurious effect” on the verdict.150 
C. THE THIRD CIRCUIT REJECTS BRECHT FOR PERJURED-
TESTIMONY CLAIMS ON COLLATERAL REVIEW 
The Ninth Circuit remained alone in its support of the un-
modified reasonable-likelihood standard until 2017, when the 
 
 145. See id. at 1111, 1117; see also O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437–
38 (1995) (“If, when all is said and done, the [court’s] conviction is sure that the 
error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand.” (alteration in original) (quoting Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946))). 
 146. 720 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 147. Id. at 1026–27. 
 148. Id. at 1026 (quoting Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir. 
2009)). 
 149. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit seemed to believe that the knowing-
use-of-perjured-testimony claim had already been procedurally defaulted when 
the petitioner failed to raise the issue at the hearing on his motion for a new 
trial. The court resolved to address the claim on its merits only because the 
government failed to raise the issue. Id. at 1025 n.2. 
 150. Id. at 1028 (quoting O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436). 
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Third Circuit stepped up to the plate. In Haskell v. Superinten-
dent Greene SCI,151 the Third Circuit was required to evaluate a 
perjured-testimony claim in which the prosecutor not only know-
ingly presented false testimony about consideration received by 
a key witness, but repeatedly emphasized these lies to the 
jury.152 
This, of course, is the case of Vance Haskell and eyewitness 
Antoinette Blue described in the Introduction.153 After Blue’s 
performance at both the pretrial and trial hearings, the prosecu-
tor in the Erie murder case, with the help of Erie police detec-
tives and a district attorney from Mercer County, assisted Blue 
in securing more favorable outcomes on pending charges in Erie 
and Mercer Counties.154 However, when questioned on the stand 
by defense counsel, Blue denied having any pending charges, or 
expecting or receiving any assistance or consideration for her 
testimony.155 Despite having explicit knowledge to the contrary, 
the prosecutor not only failed to correct Blue’s false statements, 
but also doubled down on her credibility in his closing argument, 
openly “ridicul[ing] the idea that [she] would benefit from her 
testimony.”156 Defense counsel only learned two decades after 
Haskell’s conviction that Blue was facing charges in two counties 
when she came forward with her eyewitness account, four years 
after the crime, of the shooter’s alleged identity.157 
In its analysis, the Third Circuit emphasized that even if the 
perjured testimony only goes toward the credibility of the wit-
ness, credibility matters.158 As the Supreme Court once put it: 
“Had the jury been apprised of the true facts . . . it might well 
 
 151. 866 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 152. See id. 
 153. See supra Introduction. 
 154. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 143–45. 
 155. Id. at 143. 
 156. Id. at 144. 
 157. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 26–29, 39–40, Commonwealth v. 
Haskell, No. 809 WDA 2012, 2013 WL 11256405 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012). 
 158. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 147ee also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 
(1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness 
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence . . . .”). Other courts have found 
the same. Compare Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2003) (find-
ing materiality in false testimony where the lying witness was “[the] prosecu-
tion’s chief witness” and the “conviction depended significantly on [the lying 
witness’s] testimony”) (first alteration in original), with Foley v. Parker, 488 
F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2007) (denying habeas relief where perjured testimony 
was immaterial because the lying witness “was not a crucial link in the case 
against [the petitioner]”). 
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have concluded that [the witness] had fabricated testimony in 
order to curry the favor of the very representative of the State 
who was prosecuting the case in which [he] was testify-
ing . . . .”159 Analyzing the case under the unmodified Agurs 
standard, the Third Circuit found it reasonably likely that the 
jury’s judgment could have been affected by such evidentiary 
suppression.160 Blue was a key government witness presenting 
important testimony against the petitioner.161 The State high-
lighted its own belief in her subjective importance to the case by 
vouching for her credibility at closing arguments, despite know-
ing that she had lied on the stand.162 Relative to the rest of the 
evidence in the case, Blue’s testimony was strong—she was the 
only eyewitness willing and able to consistently identify Haskell 
as the shooter.163 These factors speak to the weight and signifi-
cance of Blue’s testimony and highlight how valuable impeach-
ment evidence regarding her credibility in testifying would have 
been to defense counsel as they argued for reasonable doubt. 
In assessing the current state of the law, the Third Circuit 
embraced the same interpretation of Kyles v. Whitley as the 
Ninth Circuit had a dozen years earlier, finding that additional 
actual-prejudice analysis is not needed for any materiality 
standard that already contains harmless-error analysis. The im-
plication of Bagley, the Third Circuit explains, was that “for per-
jured-testimony claims raised in [habeas] proceedings, the ma-
teriality and harmless-error standards are one and the same;”164 
therefore actual prejudice does not apply to such claims, just as 
it did not apply to the evidentiary-withholding claims high-
lighted in Kyles.165 For the three types of prosecutorial miscon-
duct originally distinguished by Agurs, the materiality and 
harmless-error standards merge, meaning there is no need, nor 
room, to conduct a separate harmless-error test under Brecht—
because it is already baked into the test for materiality.166 
 
 159. Napue, 360 U.S. at 270. 
 160. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 146. 
 161. Id. at 145–46. 
 162. Id. at 143–45. 
 163. Id. at 146. 
 164. Id. at 149. 
 165. See id. at 149–50; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679 
(1985). 
 166. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 985 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Furthermore, the Third Circuit explained, the policy con-
cerns extrapolated in Brecht do not apply to knowing-use-of-per-
jured-testimony claims.167 Brecht was motivated by the Court’s 
concern about verdict finality, federal intrusion onto state deci-
sions, and degradation of trial prominence and the rarity of ha-
beas relief.168 While federalism concerns loom large, the Third 
Circuit observed no pressing need to honor previous state court 
decisions when the knowing use of perjured testimony repre-
sents “a bad-faith effort to deprive the defendant of his right to 
due process and obtain a conviction through deceit”169 and is con-
sidered “fundamentally unfair” by the Supreme Court.170 
With regards to finality, the Third Circuit points out that 
the entire point of habeas relief (“an extraordinary remedy”) is 
to protect and endorse the values of justice and fundamental 
fairness.171 The Third Circuit disputes the argument that a 
lower materiality standard for federal habeas claims would de-
grade the prominence of trial, pointing out that this standard 
would only apply to a small percentage of perjured-testimony 
claims: those that did not or could not arise at trial or upon direct 
review.172 The vast majority of perjured-testimony claims will 
continue to be litigated at the trial level, rather than years later 
upon collateral review. Meanwhile, direct review has a finite 
 
 167. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 151–52. 
 168. Id. (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 19, 635 (1993)). 
 169. Id. at 151. 
 170. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678–79 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 
97, 103 (1976)). 
 171. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 151 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633). 
 172. Id. (noting that “it is possible, even likely, that petitioners will not know 
of the prosecution’s use of perjured testimony until after the opportunity for 
direct review has passed”). From a commonsense standpoint, most incarcerated 
petitioners would not wait decades to raise a knowing-use-of-perjured-testi-
mony claim unless those elapsed years represented the time it took for defense 
counsel to learn of the error.  
The Brecht Court is not alone in expressing anxiety over the degrading 
prominence of trial. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88–90 (1977) (argu-
ing that a state trial should be the “decisive event” in determining guilt); For-
man v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 639 (2d Cir. 1980) (arguing that “all issues should 
be fully aired at the trial, with no inducement for the defendant . . . to withhold 
certain issues in the hope of later obtaining a more favorable ruling from a fed-
eral court”). However, as the number of jury trials continues to decline in the 
American judicial system, this argument perhaps holds less weight. For more 
on the diminishing prominence of the jury trial, see Benjamin Weiser, Trial by 
Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), 
https://nyti.ms/2aNeei4 (noting a fifty percent decrease in the number of jury 
verdicts in New York State Court between 1984 and 2015). 
  
1594 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1567 
 
statute of limitations, making it much more likely that a peti-
tioner will remain unaware of the occurrence of one of these er-
rors until long after the period for direct review has tolled.173 
Finally, there was no binding precedent holding the Third 
Circuit to the heightened Brecht standard. Although the Circuit 
had once before applied the Brecht standard to a habeas petition 
similar to the one in Haskell, that case resolved before Kyles v. 
Whitley and was later vacated under new law.174 The Circuit’s 
decision may have weighed policy heavier than precedent, but in 
light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hayes v. Brown, the Third 
Circuit was well within its discretion to join the minority split. 
The whole point of cases like Napue and Giglio, the Third Circuit 
argued, was to acknowledge the fundamental injustice created 
by the government’s knowing presentation of false testimony at 
trial.175 Because Brady violations bring the substantive fairness 
of trial into question, any violation found material can never be 
harmless under Brecht. 
III.  IN SUPPORT OF A MORE FLEXIBLE STANDARD FOR 
PERJURED-TESTIMONY CLAIMS   
The Third Circuit was correct to reject the application of the 
Brecht actual-prejudice hurdle to knowing-use-of-perjured-testi-
mony claims raised by habeas petitioners on collateral review. 
The other Circuits, including those presently undecided, should 
join the Third and Ninth Circuits in adopting the unmodified 
reasonable-likelihood materiality standard for such claims. 
By adding a second prong to the materiality standard ini-
tially created by Agurs, courts take a bright-line exemption ap-
plicable to all Brady violations and destroy it by adding an ex 
post level of analysis to a small subsection of claims. Because 
habeas petitioners already bear the shifted burden of proof on 
collateral review,176 adding an extra hurdle to the path faced by 
 
 173. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 174. Robinson v. Arvonio, 27 F.3d 877, 886 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted, va-
cated, 513 U.S. 1186 (1995). 
 175. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 145–46 (“A state violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s due process guarantee when it knowingly presents or fails to correct false 
testimony in a criminal proceeding.” (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 
(1959)); see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); see also Rosen-
crantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 593 (6th Cir. 2009) (Cole, J., dissenting) (“The 
whole purpose of the Giglio-materiality test is to identify those due process 
harms requiring post-conviction relief.” (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–54)). 
 176. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 148; see also Blume & Garvey, supra note 42, at 
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habeas petitioners does nothing more than reward prosecutors 
for successfully obfuscating justice until the appeals period has 
tolled. By presenting false testimony, the government deprives 
defendants of any chance at a fair trial. The willful abuse of pros-
ecutorial discretion, including through the knowing or negligent 
use of perjured testimony, should be a grave enough concern to 
justify the lower standard for such claims under habeas review. 
This Part offers a solution to the ongoing Circuit split over 
the level of materiality analysis required for perjured-testimony 
claims raised on collateral review. Section A explains why the 
existing reasonable-likelihood standard offers a sufficient degree 
of protection for finality and federalism, and argues that a sec-
ond level of actual-prejudice analysis need not be added to the 
standard materiality measure for perjured-testimony claims. 
Section B then argues that the Supreme Court should resolve 
the confusion left by Kyles v. Whitley by specifically exempting 
perjured-testimony claims from the Brecht actual-prejudice hur-
dle, while Section C examines an alternative solution posed by 
several of the Circuits that suggests that the Supreme Court 
step in and recategorize the knowing use of perjured testimony 
as a structural error subject to immediate reversal. 
A. THE REASONABLE-LIKELIHOOD STANDARD SUFFICIENTLY 
MEETS THE NEEDS OF HARMLESS-ERROR ANALYSIS FOR 
PERJURED-TESTIMONY CLAIMS 
Much of the confusion between the Circuits comes down to 
the Court’s actions in Kyles v. Whitley.177 Following an exhaus-
tive analysis, the Court in Kyles concluded that the reasonable-
probability standard used by the Brady evidentiary-withholding 
violations at bar fully satisfied the need for harmless-error anal-
ysis and that such claims were therefore exempt from added 
analysis under Brecht.178 With no knowing-use-of-perjured-tes-
timony claim before it, the Court declined to extend its holding 
to the last category of Brady trial errors.179 However, even 
though “reasonable probability” is a narrower standard than 
“reasonable likelihood,” the Court’s arguments against Brecht 
could easily be extended to the knowing use of perjured testi-
mony. The Court itself recognized that the reasonable-likelihood 
 
169 (“[T]he burden of proof within the law of harmless error represents a prob-
ability of prejudice, or a probability of another probability.”). 
 177. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 178. See id. at 437. 
 179. See id. at n.7. 
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standard, when used for perjured-testimony claims, produces re-
sults equivalent to harmless-error analysis (in the form of an-
other harmless-error test, Chapman’s “harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” standard).180 In fact, the Court several years 
earlier recognized that this softer standard for perjured-testi-
mony claims was justified by the level of prosecutorial miscon-
duct and “corruption of the truth-seeking function” such claims 
presented.181 
The Court in United States v. Bagley sought to retain the 
“less onerous” reasonable-likelihood standard for perjured-testi-
mony claims for a reason.182 Yet, after Kyles, a majority of de-
cided Circuits would have petitioners believe that the only Brady 
claims facing added scrutiny on collateral review were perjured-
testimony claims.183 Despite the clear intent of the Supreme 
Court in Agurs and Bagley to wrangle the use of false testimony 
by unscrupulous prosecutors,184 the pro-Brecht Circuits accept 
only the reluctant dicta put forth by the Court in Kyles,185 argu-
ing that because the Kyles Court declined to specifically extend 
its ruling to an issue not before it, the issue must by default be 
controlled by Brecht.186 But the question is moot—Kyles states 
that the actual-prejudice hurdle need not apply if harmless-error 
analysis is already present in the existing standard.187 Despite 
 
 180. In 1985, the Supreme Court observed that “this Court’s precedents in-
dicate that the standard of review applicable to the knowing use of perjured 
testimony is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard.” United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 n.9 (1985). See generally Blume & Garvey, 
supra note 42, at 164. 
 181. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
104 (1976)). 
 182. United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 183. See supra Part II.B. 
 184. See Bagley, 473 U.S. 667; Agurs, 427 U.S. 97. 
 185. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 431–33 nn.6–7 (1995) (declining to 
“consider the question whether Kyles’s conviction was obtained by the knowing 
use of perjured testimony” because the issue was not before the Court). 
 186. See, e.g., Trepal v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088, 1112–13 
(11th Cir. 2012) (“We note that no Brecht analysis is needed for Brady viola-
tions, for the Supreme Court has held that a showing of materiality under Brady 
necessarily establishes actual prejudice under Brecht.” (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
435)). 
 187. See id. at 435 (“Assuming . . . that a harmless-error enquiry were to 
apply, a Bagley error could not be treated as harmless, since ‘a reasonable prob-
ability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different[ ] ’ . . . necessarily entails the conclusion that 
the suppression must have had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict[ ] ’ . . . .” (first quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; 
and then quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993))).  
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the Court’s reluctance to explicitly extend this holding beyond 
the scope of the reasonable-probability standard, this logic holds 
true. The reasonable-likelihood standard is sufficiently capable 
of meeting the goals of harmless-error analysis on collateral re-
view, and adding an unnecessary second prong to the materiality 
test laid out by Agurs fails to serve the intent of the Court. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CONFUSION 
CREATED BY KYLES V. WHITLEY 
There are several reasons why the Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari and resolve the issue left dangling by Kyles v. 
Whitley by exempting perjured-testimony claims raised by ha-
beas petitioners from the added Brecht hurdle. First, as ex-
plained above, harmless-error analysis is already present in the 
existing materiality standard for perjured testimony.188 In 1985, 
the Supreme Court found that the reasonable-likelihood stand-
ard for knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims was “equiva-
lent to the Chapman harmless-error standard,” containing built-
in harmless-error analysis.189 This confirms that there is no need 
to apply the Brecht hurdle to any claims with an existing harm-
less-error materiality standard. 
Second, collateral review represents a last chance at liberty 
for petitioners who have exhausted all other appellate and post-
conviction options.190 The writ of habeas corpus has been under 
attack in federal courts since the mid-1980s.191 Indeed, many 
scholars consider post-conviction habeas relief “all but a dead 
letter” in the modern jurisprudence.192 This can be credited to a 
number of changes in the criminal justice system, including in-
creasing criminalization of certain acts and creation of new re-
quirements designed to limit federal habeas filings.193 
 
 188. See supra Part III.A. 
 189. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680 n.9. 
 190. Cf. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633 (calling habeas relief “an extraordinary rem-
edy”). 
 191. See generally Gershman, supra note 16 (describing the obstacles im-
posed by the Supreme Court which “block[ed]” habeas claims in cases from the 
1980s). 
 192. Carlos M. Vazquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The Constitutional Right to 
Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905, 906 (2017) (“For years, 
the prevailing academic and judicial wisdom has held that, between them, Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have rendered post-conviction habeas review all 
but a dead letter.”). 
 193. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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If the prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony does not 
come to light early enough in the appeals process, the petitioner 
may lose all opportunities to raise the issue under the unmodi-
fied Agurs reasonable-likelihood standard. Habeas scholars 
John Blume and Stephen Garvey argue that “Brecht increases 
the incentive for prosecutors to ignore or willfully neglect consti-
tutional limits and to commit constitutional error.”194 The gov-
ernment’s failure to correct false testimony before a conviction is 
entered deprives these petitioners of both a fair trial and any 
chance at a productive appeal. 
Third, while federalism and finality are real concerns, the 
Third Circuit rightly points out that the entire purpose of habeas 
relief is to protect and endorse the values of justice and funda-
mental fairness.195 When petitioners do raise perjured-testimony 
claims later in the appeals process, it is often because that is 
when they first learn of the error. In Rosencrantz, for example, 
the petitioner was only alerted that the victim lied under oath, 
and that prosecutors knowingly permitted this false testimony, 
through an affidavit submitted by a former Sheriff ’s Depart-
ment employee who interviewed the victim in jail before, during, 
and after her meetings with police detectives and an identified 
prosecutor.196 In Trepal, an expert witness’s act of perjury only 
became public knowledge after an investigative report was filed 
by the state attorney general.197 In both cases, the likelihood of 
the state’s misconduct coming to light on its own was next to nil, 
causing one to wonder exactly how many potential habeas peti-
tioners face this precise situation and never learn of it. 
Fourth, pro-Brecht Circuits interpret the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to act in Kyles as an implicit adoption of the actual-
prejudice hurdle for perjured-testimony claims.198 But reading 
Kyles in this way creates a bizarre world wherein, upon reaching 
the court of last resort, the discovery of an unintended nondis-
closure will face a lower materiality hurdle than a Brady error 
caused by state deception.199 In this world, a habeas petitioner 
 
 194. Blume & Garvey, supra note 42, at 188. 
 195. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
 196. Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 197. Trepal v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088, 1100–01 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
 198. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2013); 
Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1112 n.29; Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589; Gilday v. Callahan, 
59 F.3d 257, 267–68 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 199. Compare Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432–40 (1995) (analyzing the 
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alleging inadvertent evidentiary withholding need only to show 
that a reasonable jury would hypothetically have been affected 
by the truth. Yet, this same interpretation would require a peti-
tioner alleging acts of intentional deception by the state to show 
that a reasonable jury not only could have been affected by the 
truth, but that the false testimony presented caused actual prej-
udice in the petitioner’s case. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyles to limit the 
application of the actual-prejudice hurdle represented a sudden 
about-face by the Court just two years after it decided Brecht.200 
One reason for this shift might be found in the Court’s makeup 
at that time. Despite the short time between the two cases, the 
Court’s lineup had shifted by twenty-five percent, with Justice 
Blackmun and Justice White retiring and Justice Ginsburg and 
Justice Breyer joining the bench. Both Kyles and Brecht came 
down as 5–4 decisions, with Justice Stevens filing a concurring 
opinion on both.201 In 2018, just one of the original five majority 
votes on Brecht (Justice Thomas) and two of the original five ma-
jority votes on Kyles (Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) remain.202 
Justice Stevens, the swing vote in both cases, retired in 2010.203 
As the Supreme Court continues to face questions about the 
treatment of perjured testimony discovered after conviction is 
entered, the time is right for the Court to readdress the issue of 
 
prosecution’s inadvertent failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense 
under the “reasonable probability” standard of materiality when raised on fed-
eral collateral review), and Vaughn v. United States, 93 A.3d 1237, 1254 (D.C. 
2014) (analyzing the prosecution’s failure to disclose favorable impeachment ev-
idence about a key State witness under the “reasonable probability” standard 
when raised on direct appeal), with Woodall v. United States, 842 A.2d 690, 696 
(D.C. 2004) (analyzing appellant’s claim that the prosecution knowingly pre-
sented false testimony under the “reasonable likelihood” standard when raised 
on direct appeal), and United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 
2013) (analyzing the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony under the 
“actual prejudice” standard when raised by a habeas petitioner on federal col-
lateral review). 
 200. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 201. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454–56 (Stevens, J., concurring); Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639–44 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 202. Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2018); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421–54 
(majority opinion by J. Souter, J. Stevens, J. Ginsburg, J. Breyer, and J. O’Con-
nor); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 621–39 (majority opinion by J. Rehnquist, J. Stevens, 
J. Scalia, J. Thomas, and J. Kennedy). 
 203. Nina Totenberg, For Decades, Stevens Molded High Court Rulings, 
NPR (Apr. 9, 2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
123075821. 
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prosecutorial misconduct on collateral review.204 By moving to 
exempt perjured-testimony claims on collateral review from ac-
tual-prejudice analysis, the Court would resolve two decades of 
confusion left by the interaction between Agurs, Brecht, and 
Kyles. The Court has previously found that harmless-error anal-
ysis already exists in the reasonable-likelihood standard. By 
clarifying existing doctrine and expressly expanding the Brecht 
exemption to all Brady violations, the Court will act in support 
of long-standing policy concerns and take a hard stance against 
the imbalance of power and inherent unfairness created when 
the state withholds vital information about witness testimony 
from defendants.  
C. ALTERNATELY, THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RECATEGORIZE 
THE KNOWING USE OF PERJURED TESTIMONY AS A FORM OF 
STRUCTURAL ERROR 
Several of the pro-Brecht Circuits, displaying sympathy over 
the injustice to criminal defendants presented by the state’s 
knowing use of false testimony, have invited the Supreme Court 
to take up the issue and reclassify the knowing presentation of 
false testimony as a structural error, on par with judicial or ra-
cial bias.205 Indeed, this would appear to present an elegant so-
lution to the issue. 
Structural errors, like denial of the right to counsel, are not 
subject to harmless-error review.206 The rationale for this is 
 
 204. See, e.g., Long v. Pfister, 874 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that the 
prosecution failed to correct false testimony by a witness but declining to grant 
collateral relief where the Supreme Court had not taken a firm stance on the 
issue), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1593 (2018). The Third Circuit’s decision and ra-
tionale in Haskell were heavily cited by the briefs in this petition for certiorari. 
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Long, 138 S. Ct. 1593 (mem.) (2018) (No. 17-
991); Brief in Opposition, Long, 138 S. Ct. 1593 (2018) (No. 17-991).  
 205. See, e.g., Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir. 2009) (de-
clining to deem knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims as “structural” errors 
because the Supreme Court had not done so). Brecht even leaves the door open 
to this, acknowledging that certain scenarios (“deliberate and especially egre-
gious error of the trial type, or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecu-
torial misconduct”) run the risk of so direly “infect[ing] the integrity of the pro-
ceeding as to warrant . . . habeas relief, even if [the error] did not substantially 
influence the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9. An example of such a 
pattern might be found in the extreme and repeated misconduct of Oklahoma 
County District Attorney Robert H. Macy in death penalty cases, yet the Tenth 
Circuit repeatedly found his conduct to only meet the level of harmless error. 
Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 423 
(2007). 
 206. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629–30. 
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structural errors present a far greater risk to the integrity of the 
court than constitutional trial errors: “[T]he distinction between 
trial error and structural error is based on the truth-seeking 
function of the trial process and the reliability of the result 
reached through that process.”207 In this sense, unlike the bulk 
of Brady violations, which address prosecutorial withholding of 
existing evidence, the state’s knowing presentation of false tes-
timony reflects concerns shared by structural errors. Structural 
errors “arise from the breach of rules that do not directly regu-
late the admission of evidence and that serve some purpose other 
than promoting reliability.”208 These constitutional rights pro-
tected by such structural errors are so inherent, yet so difficult 
to safeguard, that “[they] can only be protected and en-
forced . . . with a rule of automatic reversal.”209 When a prosecu-
tor knowingly presents the fact-finding jury with testimony that 
he or she knows to be untrue, this casts the “truth-seeking func-
tion” of trial into question.210 Without the safeguard of automatic 
reversal, violations of the rules against prosecutorial misconduct 
would have to be subjected to actual-prejudice analysis, “in es-
sence convert[ing] the rights supported by these rules into rights 
without remedies.”211 
However, despite the strength of arguments that the state’s 
knowing use of perjured testimony presents a risk to the ulti-
mate fairness of trial on par with other structural errors, such a 
recategorization could have a dramatic impact on the landscape 
of post-conviction relief. The ability to find an alleged Brady vi-
olation immaterial and thus harmless makes sense when consid-
ering the Court’s interest in finality and its expressed disinterest 
in seeing cases relitigated. The reasonable-likelihood standard 
maintains harmlessness as an option, while leaving ample room 
for petitioners to seek justice, and should therefore be preserved. 
  CONCLUSION   
The writ of habeas corpus seeks to provide a last chance at 
freedom for incarcerated individuals; for this reason, the stakes 
 
 207. Blume & Garvey, supra note 42, at 185 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991)). 
 208. Id. at 186. 
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 210. See id. at 185–88 (discussing the possibility of certain prosecutorial mis-
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for habeas petitioners are exceptionally high, and there is a sub-
stantial risk to liberty in placing an added hurdle in front of ha-
beas petitioners attempting to raise a material claim of prosecu-
torial misconduct—particularly when these petitioners already 
face a shifted burden of proof. 
Like the evidentiary-withholding claims in Kyles v. Whitley, 
the knowing use of perjured testimony should be exempt from 
actual-prejudice analysis on collateral review. Brecht v. Abra-
hamson attempted to change the game for habeas petitioners. 
Yet, the Court has repeatedly recognized that the knowing use 
of false testimony against criminal defendants deserves a harder 
look than most constitutional trial errors, and there remains lit-
tle reason to diminish this standard on federal collateral review. 
By grouping all Brady prosecutorial misconduct violations under 
the same Brecht exemption, the Supreme Court will set a clear 
standard of conduct and review for prosecutors in criminal cases. 
The Supreme Court should recognize the discrepancy cre-
ated by Kyles and allow perjured-testimony claims to join the 
other Brady violations in discarding actual-prejudice analysis on 
collateral review. 
 
